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Introduction
The sharing economy or “new economy”1 has redefined consumption in the housing context in a manner that impacts traditional notions regarding home values and neighborhood integrity.  Housing sharing 
allows owners to share some of the benefits of property ownership – namely 
use and enjoyment2 – while shifting some of the burdens of ownership – 
particularly, the economic burdens.  With the advent of the sharing economy, 
there is a brewing conflict between this new economy and the realities of 
economic regulation.  Thus, in the housing context, we see this conflict playing 
out in the tension between growing patterns of home sharing and existing 
regulations that prohibit such sharing.  Many state and local governments, 
relying on their inherent police powers, regulate short-term housing. In 
particular, certain land use legislation overtly prohibits occupation by 
short-term renters.  One prominent justification for such prohibitions is the 
maintenance of property values and neighborhood character.  
I argue that, despite short-term housing prohibitions and the underlying policies 
supporting them, such exchanges can actually help to preserve property values by 
providing income to homeowners that can be used to offset mortgage and maintenance 
costs – in other words, by allowing owners to share the burdens of ownership.  Thus, rather 
than frustrating the goals and purposes for which old economy regulations were designed 
(e.g., the preservation of property values and neighborhood character), housing exchanges 
may instead aid in achieving these aims.  Specifically, if homeowners are able to do so, they 
are more likely to be able to maintain their homes in the short-term and, in the long-term, 
to maintain ownership.      
Policies that curtail short-term rental housing are of a bygone era and are ill-suited 
to address the modern sharing economy.  The number of online platforms designed to 
link property owners with potential short-term lessees has grown rapidly over the last 
few years.  For instance, Airbnb.com (“Airbnb”) -- the most well-known of these platforms 
-- boasts that it has connected over twenty-five million guests with hosted properties in 
34,000 cities in 190 countries since its founding in 2008.3  
Sharing and bartering housing resources is not new.  Historically, the concept has long 
existed in the context of lodging purchased on a time- or space-limited basis in inns and 
1 See Jenny Kassan and Janell Orsi, The Legal Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 1, 2, 5 (2012) (listing some of the 
names of the new economy, such as the “relationship economy,” “cooperative economy,” “access economy,” “peer-to-peer (or p2p) economy,” and 
the “grassroots economy.”). The modern sharing economy is diverse and is made up of various types of organizations and structures, including 
shared housing. Id. at 3 (noting that the sharing economy consists of “social enterprises, cooperatives, urban farms, cohousing communities, time 
banks, local currencies, and [a] vast array of other unique organizations.”). What ties these various components together is that they “generally 
facilitate community ownership, localized production, sharing, cooperation, [and] small scale enterprise.” Id.
2 The liberal view of property is represented by the prevailing Hohfeld-Honore “bundle of rights analysis.”  See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of 
Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711, 712-13 (1996) (“The currently prevailing understanding of property . . . is that property is 
best understood as a ‘bundle of rights.’” (citations omitted)).  Penner uses this term to describe the conflation of Wesley N. Hohfeld’s analysis of 
rights and the incidents of ownership delineated by A.M. Honore.  In this view, property includes the rights of use and enjoyment, possession, 
and alienation. See John S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy bk. II, ch. ii, at 218 (W. Ashley ed., 1909)).
3 Airbnb, About Us, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
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boarding houses, rooms for rent, housing cooperatives, and informal arrangements.4  The 
catalyst for such sharing has often been the quest for affordability, coupled with housing 
scarcity.  In the contemporary context, we see a home sharing proliferation the catalyst of 
which is also the scarcity of resources – both affordable housing itself and the monetary 
resources with which to maintain home ownership.  What is unique to home sharing in the 
new economy is not the sharing, but rather the way in which such sharing is facilitated by 
technology and how the use of such technology is causing innovation in sharing to outpace 
changes in housing regulation.5 
This Article focuses on the question of whether short-term rental arrangements 
negatively impact neighborhood character and home values.  Part I gives an overview of the 
character of and justifications for municipal short-term leasing restrictions.  Part II examines 
the Airbnb controversy in New York City.  Finally, Part III argues that municipalities may 
actually be doing themselves a disservice when they prohibit these new economy housing 
exchanges because they may be missing out on an opportunity to reap enhanced economic 
benefits from permitting such exchanges.  
The Character of and Justification for Short-Term Rental 
Restrictions
The Supreme Court long ago recognized the validity of zoning regulations as a proper 
exercise of the police power.6  However, the Court noted that the extent of the police power 
“varies with circumstances and conditions.”7  Thus, when examining the character of 
the various state and local government restrictions, it is important to do so in the context 
of local community circumstances.  Local considerations have resulted in a number of 
different types of short-term rental restrictions.   Current short-term rental restriction 
can be divided into six types: (1) full prohibitions; (2) geographically-based restrictions; 
(3) quantitative restrictions; (4) proximity restrictions; (5) operational restrictions; and (6) 
licensing requirements.8  
Full Prohibitions and Geographically-Based Restrictions on Short-
Term Rentals
Those localities that fully prohibit short-term rentals do so on a community-wide basis.9 
However, some municipalities also enact such full prohibitions only in certain geographical 
locations, such as particular zoning districts or neighborhoods.10
Full prohibitions may constitute a regulatory taking of private property without just 
compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.11  Governmental restrictions on the use of real property for the purpose 
4 See David Faflick, Boarding Out: Inhabiting the America Literary Imagination, 1804-1860 39-41 (2012) (noting that “Dutch merchants [in 
the New World] enjoyed the temporary shelter afforded them by boarding as early as the seventeenth century,” acknowledging the long-standing 
existence of such arrangement in Europe, and charting its development in America).
5 See Kassan & Orsi, supra note 1 at 5; Molly Cohen and Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating the Sharing Economy, 58 
Boston B.J. 6 (2014) (noting that the sharing economy is “[a]n old concept made new through internet-based sharing.”).
6 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Co. at 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
7 Id.
8 Rental restrictions may also be organized with respect to the entity that imposes them – such entities being local governments, residents, 
developers or a combination of these entities.  Ngai Pindell, Home Sweet Home? The Efficacy of Rental Restrictions to Promote Neighborhood 
Stability 29 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 41, 47 (2009).
9 See, e.g., N.Y. Multiple Dwelling Law, Article 1, §4.8(a) (“[a] Class A multiple dwelling shall only be used for permanent residence purposes”).
10 See e.g., Maui County, Haw., Code § 19.38.030(B) (2004) (Maui County, Hawaii ordinance limiting “transient vacation rentals” to “destina-
tion resort areas” and certain other business zoning districts). 
11 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.” 
U.S. Const. amend. V. The Takings Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of . . . property, without due process of law . . . .”); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987)(The 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is made applicable to the states via the Fourteen Amendment.). A property owner who is seeking to 
establish a claim pursuant to the Takings Clause must identify (1) the property taken; (2) the governmental conduct that resulted in the taking; 
Cornell Real Estate REview
14
of short-term rentals may be classed as  “inverse condemnation” – an instance where 
the government has taken property or impacted property rights without utilizing the 
condemnation process and, therefore, without providing just compensation for the taking.12 
Inverse condemnation applies both to physical invasions of private property and to so-
called “regulatory takings”—those instances in which the government has regulated the 
use of property in a manner so as to constitute a constructive taking thereof.  The genesis 
of the idea of the “regulatory taking” can be found in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,13 
wherein, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., writing for the Court, famously concluded 
that, with regard to government regulation of property rights, “The general rule at least is 
that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.”14 
Quantitative Restrictions on Short-Term Restrictions 
Municipalities that have enacted quantitative restrictions allow short-term rentals 
throughout the community, but limit the number of such rentals.  Often, these communities 
take the approach of issuing short-term rental permits to property owners, but capping 
the number of such permits that may be issued.15  As an alternative to an absolute cap, 
some municipalities mandate that a certain ratio of long-term to short-term residential use 
be maintained throughout the community or within certain designated zoning areas.16 
The impact of either approach is that owners who may want to enter the short-term rental 
market may be prohibited from doing so if the permitting cap has already been reached or 
if the mandated ratio cannot be maintained. 
Proximity Restrictions on Short-Term Rentals
In contrast to the quantitative restrictions, some municipalities restrict new short-
term rentals from being located within a certain distance of an existing short-term rental 
property.17  Again, the manner of restriction may have the effect of preventing new entrants 
into the short-term market.
Operational Restrictions Affecting Short-Term Rentals
Many regulations restricting short-term rentals focus on the operational aspects of 
renting.  These restrictions are also designed to prevent new entrants into the short-term 
rental market.  For example, a municipality may limit the maximum overnight occupancy of 
and (3) the just compensation that would remedy the taking. See generally 3 Sands, Libonati & Martinez, Local Government Law: A Transac-
tional Approach §16.53.20 (2000).
12 Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty., 482 U.S. 304, 317 (1987) (“While the typical taking occurs when the govern-
ment acts to condemn property in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the 
proposition that the taking may occur without such formal proceedings.”). If the government would like to acquire private property for public 
use, it must usually commence by attempting to negotiate a purchase agreement with the owner. If its attempts at negotiation fail, it will begin 
the condemnation process via the courts. At trial the government has to establish authority to condemn, which may require it show that the 
proposed taking is ‘necessary’, thus establishing its authority to condemn the property. If successful, the government will be required to pay 
just compensation to the owner for the taking. See Jessie Dukeminier, James E. Krier, Gregory S. Alexander & Michael H. Schill, Property 1081 
(2010) (7th ed. 2010).
13 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
14 The issue in Pennsylvania Coal was whether the effect of the Kohler Act—which prohibited the mining of anthracite coal in a manner that, 
among other things, would cause subsidence to any residential structure—amounted to a taking. The Court held that “To make it commercially 
impractical to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.” Id. at 515.
15 See, e.g., City of Santa Fe, N.M., Code §14-6.2(A)(6)(a)(i) (2011) (limiting the number of short-term rental permits to 350, unless the dwell-
ing unit in question qualifies for a permit as an “accessory dwelling unit, owner-occupied unit, or unit located within a ‘development containing 
resort facilities.’”
16 See, e.g., Mendocino County, Cal., Code § 20.748.020(A) (1995) (mandating that a ratio of thirteen long-term to one short-term dwelling 
units be maintain throughout the county).
17 See, e.g., San Luis Obispo County, Cal., Code § 23.08.165(c) (2012) (prohibiting residential vacation rentals from being established within 
200 feet on the same block of any existing residential vacation rental or “visitor-servicing accommodation”).
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short-term rental properties.  Such restrictions may be based on the number of bedrooms18 
in the property or on some other quantitative aspect of the property.19  Alternatively, rental 
period regulations that limit the number of times that a property may be rented may be 
enacted.20  These types of operational restrictions increase the cost of providing short-term 
rentals and, therefore, frustrate the very aim of owners seeking to reduce, shift or share the 
cost of ownership.
Licensing Requirements Affecting Short-Term Rentals
Some local government entities require that property owners seeking to use their 
properties for short-term rentals obtain a license to do so.  Such licensing is often conditioned 
upon the property’s passing various inspections.21 Moreover, licensees may be subject to 
the payment of licensing fees and periodic  renewals and, thus, additional fees. Often, this 
type of “procedural rental requirement [is employed] to ensure that landlords maintain 
their rental properties and that renters are well-behaved.”22 
Justifications for Municipal Short-Term Rental   Restrictions 
Communities justify restrictions of short-term leasing using various lines of reasoning, 
the most prominent of which (2) focus on issues related to taxation and revenue; (3) are 
public safety-based; or (3) relate to protecting property values and the character of the 
neighborhood;  
1. Revenue and Competition with Licensed Lodging
The hotel industry has lobbied for bans prohibiting short-term rentals, or at the 
very least, tougher regulations that would compel owners to pay the same sorts of 
occupancy taxes and other fees to which licensed hotels are subject. By the same 
token, local governments have often couched their objections to prohibited short-
term rentals in terms of lost hotel occupancy tax revenue.23 
2. Public Safety
Local governments argue that the state is obliged to regulate the relationship 
between property owners and renters in order to protect the public from 
possibly unsafe lodging situations.  Thus, municipalities argue that occupancy 
limits and inspection requirements, for example, are not designed to prevent 
owners from entering the rental market, rather they are meant to ensure that the 
renting public remains safe.  As noted above, this reasoning is best-suited for a 
regulatory scheme that is mediating vertical relationships, rather than horizontal 
peer-to-peer relationships that have the tendency to be self regulating.  Such 
burdensome requirements may have the unintended consequence of creating an 
“underground” market for short-term housing rentals.  In essence, this is what is 
happening in municipalities with total bans as well.  Although hosts are using a 
publicly-accessible website to facilitate sort-term rental relationships, these hosts 
have often taking the calculated risk of disregarding bans or onerous regulation in 
18 See, e.g. Isle of Palms City, S.C., Code § 5-4-202(1) (2007) (limiting overnight occupancy to two persons per bedroom, plus and additional 
two persons).
19 See, e.g. Sonoma County, Cal., Code § 26-88-120(f)(2) (2010) (limiting maximum overnight occupancy by the design load of the septic 
system).
20 See, e.g., Santa Fe, NM City Code §14-6.2(A)(6)(a)(ii) (limiting short-term rental units to a maximum of 17 rental periods per calendar year 
and limiting properties to one rental per consecutive seven-day period).
21 See, e.g., Tillamook County (OR) Short Term Rental Ordinances, Section 6 (Standards) and 9.A.b (Short Term Renal Permit Application 
Requirements) (requiring that short-term rental properties be certified by a building inspector with regard to minimum fire extinguishers and 
smoke detectors and emergency escape standards, as well as structural requirements).
22 See Pindell supra note 8 at 49.
23 See, e.g., Decision and Order, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, No. 5393-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 13, 2014) available at http://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/1159527-airbnb-new-york-decision.html#document/p9 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
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order to shift a portion of their ownership burden, thus creating a “black market” 
in housing sharing.
3. Property Values and Character of the Neighborhood
Conventional thinking has been that short-term rental restrictions increase 
property values by causing owners to adhere to maintaining a gold standard of 
single-family ownership and occupancy.  However, it is possible that property 
values may increase as a result of government’s allowing owners to enter into 
the short-term market, especially if, in the long-run, by doing so, the owner is 
able to alleviate some of the burden of ownership and thereby avoid deferring 
maintenance or, in the extreme, avoiding foreclosure.
The argument regarding the protection of the character of a particular residential 
neighborhood pits permanent residents against short-term residents and the 
owners that rent to them.  Permanent residents may argue that short-term tenants 
do not have ties to the community and do not or cannot, therefore, reflect the values 
of the community.  These arguments conflate the length of stay in a community 
with the ability (or more precisely the inability) to be a good neighbor. 
The New York Airbnb Controversy  
The recent New York Airbnb controversy is a good example of the tensions between 
new economy home sharing and old economy regulation.  In October 2013, New York 
Attorney General Eric Schneiderman subpoenaed Airbnb’s records, requesting data on 
its hosts24 for the previous three years.25  Schneiderman contended that Airbnb hosts in 
New York City — Airbnb’s largest United States market26 — were violating a provision of 
the New York Multiple Dwelling Law which requires that certain multiple dwelling units 
only be occupied by “permanent occupants” – those residing in the unit for thirty or more 
consecutive days.27  The Attorney General also asserted that Airbnb hosts in New York City 
were not complying with state and local tax registration and collection requirements.28
Airbnb moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that: “(i) there is no reasonable, articulable 
basis to warrant such an investigation and the subpoena constitutes an unfounded ‘fishing 
expedition’; (ii) any investigation is based upon laws that are unconstitutionally vague; 
(iii) the subpoena is overbroad and burdensome; and (iv) the subpoena seeks confidential, 
private information from petitioner’s [Airbnb’s] users.”29
Judge Gerald W. Connolly of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Albany 
County held that the subpoena must be quashed because the requests contained therein 
were overly broad. The court made this determination despite its finding that a predicate 
factual basis had been established with “evidence [supporting the assertion that a substantial 
number of Hosts may be in violation of the Multiple Dwelling Law and/or New York State 
24 Airbnb refers to the property owners who use its platform as “hosts” and the lessees as “guests.” Airbnb, supra note 3.
25 See Decision and Order, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, No. 5393-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 13, 2014), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/1159527-airbnb-new-york-decision.html#document/p9; see also, Stephanie Burnett, Airbnb Hands Over Data on 124 Hosts in New 
York City to the Authorities, Time, Aug. 25, 2014, available at http://time.com/3180103/airbnb-hands-over-data-on-124-hosts-in-new-york-city-
to-the-authorities/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
26 Tom Slee, Whimsley, Trust, Ratings and the Data Behind Airbnb’s Host Turnover, available at http://skift.com/2014/06/12/trust-ratings-and-
the-data-behind-airbnbs-host-turnover/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
27 N.Y. Multiple Dwelling Law, Aricle 1, §4.8(a) (providing that “[a] Class A multiple dwelling shall only be used for permanent residence 
purposes” and defines “Class A dwelling” as including tenements, apartment houses, studio apartments, duplex apartments and kitchenette 
apartments.  Further providing that “[f]or purposes of this definition, ‘permanent residence purposes’ shall consist of occupancy of a dwelling 
unit by the same natural person or family for thirty consecutive days or more and a person or family so occupying a dwelling unit shall be re-
ferred to herein as the permanent occupants of such dwelling unit.”);see Decision and Order, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, No. 5393-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
May 13, 2014) available at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1159527-airbnb-new-york-decision.html#document/p9; N.Y. Multiple 
Dwelling Law, Article 1, §4.8(a).
28 See Decision and Order, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, No. 5393-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 13, 2014) available at http://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/1159527-airbnb-new-york-decision.html#document/p9; Affidavit of Sumanta Ray in Opposition to Airbnb, Inc’s Motion to Quash 
and in Support of the Attorney General’s cross-Motion to Compel Responses to an Investigatory Subpoena, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, No. 5393-13 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 13, 2014), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1145999-new-york-attorney-general-analysis-of-airbnb.
html#document/p3 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
29 See Decision and Order, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, No. 5393-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 13, 2014), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/1159527-airbnb-new-york-decision.html#document/p9.
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and/or New York City tax provisions.”30 
The court also held that Airbnb’s constitutional vagueness argument was not yet ripe 
for review because there was no actual controversy ongoing between the state and the 
hosts.31  Additionally, the court held that Airbnb had failed to show that the information 
requested by the subpoena was confidential.32
The court noted that the subpoena demanded information on “all Hosts that rent 
Accommodation(s) in New York State.”33  The Multiple Dwelling Law, however,  applies 
only to “cities with a population of three hundred twenty-five thousand or more.”34 
Moreover, the court found fault with the subpoena’s not limiting its request to rentals of 
less than thirty days.35  
With respect to the tax-related allegations made by the Attorney General, the court 
also took issue with the fact that the subpoena was not limited to New York City hosts 
and did not take into account the various exceptions to the state and city tax regulations.36 
In particular, the court noted that the Attorney General acknowledged the existence of 
exceptions to the hotel occupancy tax that exempted hosts who rented their properties “’for 
less than 4 days, or for fewer than three occasions during the year (for any number of total 
days).’”37
One day after the court’s ruling, the Attorney General issued a second subpoena to 
Airbnb.38  This second subpoena was revised to address the court’s concerns about over 
breadth.39  Less than a week after the issuance of the second subpoena, Airbnb and the 
Attorney General entered into an agreement whereby Airbnb would provide the Attorney 
general with anonymized data on its New York City hosts. 40  If after reviewing such data, 
the Attorney General or the New York City Office of Special Enforcement instituted an 
investigation of or undertook an enforcement action against a specific host, Airbnb agreed 
that it would provide non-anonymized information on that host.41  
Five months later, in October 2014, Attorney General Schneiderman released Airbnb in 
the City, a report on the information that it had gathered from Airbnb as a result of the May 
2014 agreement.42  The report analyzed Airbnb bookings for “private stays”43 in New York 
City from January 1, 2010 through June 2, 2014 (referred to in the report as the “Review 
Period”).44  According to the report, during the Review Period, “72 percent of units used as 
private short-term rentals on Airbnb appeared to violate [the Multiple Dwelling Law].”45  
The New York Attorney General’s earlier subpoena and eventual conclusions 
30 Id. ; see also Affidavit of Sumanta Ray in Opposition to Airbnb, Inc’s Motion to Quash and in Support of the Attorney General’s cross-Motion 
to Compel Responses to an Investigatory Subpoena Airbnb v. Schneiderman, No. 5393-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 13, 2014), available at http://www.
documentcloud.org/documents/1145999-new-york-attorney-general-analysis-of-airbnb.html#document/p3.
31 See Decision and Order, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, No. 5393-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 13, 2014), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/1159527-airbnb-new-york-decision.html#document/p9.
32 See Id. (noting that petitioner’s privacy policy provides that it will disclose hosts’ information at its discretion).
33 Id.
34 N.Y. Multiple Dwelling Law §3.
35 See Decision and Order, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, No. 5393-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 13, 2014), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/1159527-airbnb-new-york-decision.html#document/p9.
36 Id.
37 Id. (quoting Respondent Memo. In Opp., p. 13).
38 See Benjamin Snyder, New York Attorney General Issues New Subpoena in Airbnb Case, Fortune (May 15, 2014), available at http://fortune.
com/2014/05/15/new-york-attorney-general-issues-new-subpoena-in-airbnb-case/ (last visted Feb. 28, 2015); see also Letter from Attorney 
General Eric T. Schneiderman to Belinda Johnson, General Counsel, Airbnb, Inc., dated May 20, 2014, available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/
OAG_Airbnb_Letter_of_Agreement.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) (noting that a subpoena for records was issued on May 14, 2014).
39 See Snyder, supra note 38.
40 See Letter from Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman to Belinda Johnson, General Counsel, Airbnb, Inc., (May 20, 2014), available at 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAG_Airbnb_Letter_of_Agreement.pdf .
41 See Id.  Airbnb has complied with this agreement, supplying the Attorney General with anonymized information on approximately 16,000 
hosts and in August 2014, giving the Attorney General specific, non-anonymized information on 124 hosts. Stephanie Burnett, Airbnb Hands 
Over Data on 124 Hosts in New York City to the Authorities, Time, Aug. 25, 2014, available at http://time.com/3180103/airbnb-hands-over-data-
on-124-hosts-in-new-york-city-to-the-authorities/.
42 New York State Office of the Attorney General, Airbnb in the City, Oct. 2014, available at http://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Airbnb%20report.pdf.
43 A “private stay” is one in which the entire house or apartment is available to the guest and the host is not present in the unit during the 
stay. Id. at n. 1. 
44 Id. at 2.
45 Id. at 2, 8.
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regarding Airbnb and its hosts is emblematic of the tension inherent in the current regulatory 
scheme.  A revision of the underlying policies justifying the restricting of short-term rentals 
is necessary in order to align our legal framework with our new economic reality.  
Using "New Economy" Principles to Analyze the Impact of 
Short-Term rental Restrictions on Property Values and the 
Character of the Neighborhood
An owner’s participation in home sharing by renting his or her property on a short-term 
basis impacts the use and enjoyment “sticks” in the traditional Hohfeld-Honore “bundle of 
rights analysis” of property.46  By contrast, regulations prohibiting or restricting short-term 
rentals are a restraint on the right to alienate property – another stick in the bundle of rights. 
A question that must be address is whether by imposing such a restraint on alienation – one 
that restricts an owner’s right to shift use and enjoyment on a short-term basis – state and 
local governments actually further their stated goals of preserving property values and 
neighborhood integrity.
The New York Attorney General’s report was critical of the fact that six percent of hosts 
seemed to be “Commercial Users” in that they accounted for 36% of all private short-term 
bookings.47 However, it must be noted that all Airbnb hosts are engaged in commercial 
activity – not just those deemed “commercial” by the Attorney General’s office.  A hallmark 
of the sharing economy is the blurring of the line between commercial and non-commercial 
activities.  As Professor Arun Sundararajan noted,
One hundred years ago there wasn’t a clear line between someone who ran a hotel and 
someone who let people stay in their homes. It was much more fluId.  Then we drew clear 
lines between people who did something for a living and people who did it casually not for 
money.  Airbnb . . . [is] blurring these lines.48 
Jurisdictions outside of New York have addressed this issue.  For example, the plaintiffs 
in a case heard by the California Court of Appeal, Sixth District argued that the defendant 
municipality Carmel-by-the-Sea acted arbitrarily by restricting transient commercial use of 
residential property – in particular short-term rentals – while other commercial uses such as 
home occupations were permitted by the ordinance in question.49  The court, however, found 
that home occupations “do not threaten the basic character of a residential neighborhood. 
Rather, they strengthen the community by fostering the talents of its residents.”50   I argue 
that the Ewing court’s definition of “community-strengthening” activities is too limited 
and should include the economic strengthening provided by an influx of short-term rental 
income and the benefits that this income provides to property owners. 
The plaintiffs also complained that Carmel had drawn the line between impermissible 
short-term and permissible long-term rentals arbitrarily by permitting rentals of 30 
consecutive days but not 29. The court, however, citing Euclid v. Ambler Co.,51 gave great 
deference to the legislature in making this determination: 
Line drawing is the essence of zoning. Sometimes the line is pencil-point thin—
allowing, for example, plots of 1/3 acre but not 1/4, buildings of 3 floors but not 4, beauty 
46 See discussion of Hohfeld-Honore “bundle of rights analysis” supra note 3.
47 New York State Office of the Attorney General, supra note 42 at 2, 10-11.
48 Joel Stein, Baby, You Can Drive My Car, and Stay in My Guest Room, and Do My Errands, and Rent my Stuff: My Wild Ride Through the New 
On-Demand Economy, Time, 32, 38-40 (Feb. 9, 2015), available at http://time.com/3687305/testing-the-sharing-economy/ (last visited Mar. 2, 
2015). 
49 Ewing v. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, 234 Cal App. 3d 1579, 1592-93 (1991); Carmel Ordinance No. 17.24.020 permits home occupations in 
the R–1 District, including “painting and related graphics, music, dance, dramatics, sculpture, writing, photography, weaving, ceramics, needlec-
raft, jewelry, glass and metal crafts.” By contrast the New York Multiple Dwelling Law allows joint living-working quarters for “artists,” as defined 
by the statute.  See N.Y. Multiple Dwelling Law, Article 7, § 277.
50 Ewing v. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1593 (citing County of Butte v. Bach, 172 Cal.App.3d 848, 865 (1985) (home occupa-
tion exception in a zoning ordinance “implicitly premised upon expectations that the number and distribution of such encroachments will not 
be intolerable and that persons who live where they work are likely to have less detrimental impact than nonresidents”).
51 272 U.S. 365.
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shops but not beauty schools. In Euclid, the Supreme Court recognized that “in some fields, 
the bad fades into the good by such insensible degrees that the two are not capable of being 
readily distinguished and separated in terms of legislation.” Nonetheless, the line must be 
drawn, and the legislature must do it. Absent an arbitrary or unreasonable delineation, it is 
not the prerogative of the courts to second-guess the legislative decision.52 
Moreover, the court opined that “long-term tenants may create as stable a community 
as resident homeowners.”53 Further, the court found that “the 30–day cutoff [was] not 
arbitrary but, rather, reasonably linked to that goal [of creating community stability].54 
As noted earlier, this type reasoning is best-suited for the old economy and a regulatory 
scheme that is mediating vertical relationships, rather than the horizontal peer-to-peer 
relationships of the sharing economy.
Conclusion
Both vacationers and those traveling for business have expressed an increased interest 
in staying in homes rather than hotels.  Although this may in the short-term cause a decline 
in hotel tax revenue in some cities, a well-thought-out taxing scheme for the sort of short-
term rentals that are prevalent in the sharing economy can provide cities and states with a 
means of recouping these tax revenue losses while providing greater benefits in stabilizing 
existing ownership.
The ability to rent one’s property – even in the short-term – may be a tremendous aid 
to struggling homeowners.  By providing short-term rentals, owner may shift and share 
the burden of homeownership. This shifting can help to defray mortgage, homeowners 
association, and real estate tax costs.  Moreover, the sharing of this burden, through the 
consequent sharing of the benefits of homeownership – use and enjoyment in particular – 
can help to avoid or at least mitigate instances of blight due to disrepair, distressed sales 
at below-market-rate sales prices, and even foreclosures.  Thus, allowing owners to home 
share can protect a community’s character and property values by helping to insulate 
individual owners from the effects of negative housing market downturns.
52 Ewing v. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, 234 Cal. App.3d at 1593 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389); see also Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35–36 (1954).
53 Ewing v. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, 234 Cal. App.3d at 1593
54 Id.
